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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH T. DAVIES, JUNE SUTTON, 
J. KENNETH DAVIES, THOMAS L. 
DAVIES, DANIE W. DAVIES, LORA 
A. DAVIES and PAULINE T. DAVIES, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VIVIAN M. BEZZANT and EVA JANE 
CORNWELL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 14049 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action to quiet title to a portion 
of the residential property encompassed within defendants' 
fence line. Defendants counterclaimed under the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence and sought to have the property 
within the confines of the fence line quieted in them. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court found in favor of the plaintiffs and 
entered a judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek the affirmance of the lower court's 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts made by 
the appellants except that two additional facts should be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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stated, The conveyance which is described in appellants1 
Statement of Facts at page 2 from Tippets to Elder was for 
a parcel of land having dimensions of 88.88 feet by 110 feet. 
The parcel of land which Elder testified that he went upon 
the land and staked out (Tr. 20) was a parcel of land having 
dimensions of 88,88 feet by 157*06 feet. The contract between 
Elder and the Olivers (Ex* 3) described the larger parcel 
while Elder¥s deed.to the Olivers (Ex. 4) conveyed the smaller 
parcel. Also, the Uniform Real Estate Contract (defendants1 
Ex.. 3-) between the Elders and Olivers contained the following-
statement: "Seller agrees to furnish title to Buyer at no 
extra cost to land between East boundary of said land and 
the proposed street, of which is included in the above descrip 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I -: 
THE DISPUTE IN THIS CASE DID NOT ARISE OUT OF AMY 
UNCERTAINTY OR DISPUTE WITH RESPECT TO BOUNDARY 
LINES 
The facts upon which the defendants rely as the source 
of their title occurred in 1950 (Tr* 19, 20). They consist 
of an oral agreement .made between Elder and Seamanj contract 
buyers, and the owner, Tippets:. The agreement between the 
vendee Elder and Beaman and the vendor, Tippets, was reached 
after Elder had constructed his home. (Tr. 20). 
The agreement did not arise out of any uncertainty with 
respect to boundary lines * The agreement was an agreement 
of purchase and sale, one between a vendor and a vendee. 
The purpose of the meeting on the land in 19 5 0 could only 
have been to select land in addition to that which already Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f if' 
had been purchased. It could not be assumed that four men 
would mistakenly mark out a tract of land 157.06 feet long 
to identify a parcel 110 feet long. 
The problems in this case arose because the purchase 
price of the land in dispute was not paid. They did not 
arise by virtue of any dispute or uncertainty respecting 
a boundary line. There are four deeds and a Certificate 
of Sale of Real Estate Under Foreclosure in the defendants' 
chain of title following the 19 50 agreement between Elder 
as purchaser and Beaman and Tippets as vendors. All of the 
conveyances agree exactly. 
First is the deed from Elders to Olivers, dated January 
25, 1960. (Ex. 4). Next the Certificate of Sale of Real 
Estate Under Foreclosure dated January 10, 1963. (Ex. 10). 
Next the Olivers conveyed to Beneficial Industrial Loan Corpora-
tion in April of 1963. (Exs. 11 and 12). Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Corporation conveyed to the defendants in May of 1963. 
(Ex. 13). 
None of the above conveyances included the land here 
in dispute. 
Plaintiffs' predecessors in title, the Tippets, were 
not indolent or neglectful. 
Tippets sold the land to Beaman in 1948. (Tr. 27). 
Sometime in 1952 Elder and Beaman called Neff Tippets while 
Mr. Tippets was living In Laramie, Wyoming. (Tr. 29, 45). 
They discussed the purchase of the land here in dispute and 
discussed the price to be paid. Neff Tippets discussed the 
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purchase of the land in dispute with Mr. Elder later in 1954 
or 1955. (Tr. 31). 
In 1958 Eugene Oliver inquired of Neff Tippets about 
clearing the title to the land in dispute. (Tr. 34). Neff 
Tippets obtained a survey from a licensed surveyor, (Ex. 
5) and obtained a description preparatory to deeding the 
land to Oliver. (Tr. 34, Ex. 8). 
Exhibit 6 is a copy of a letter written by Neff Tippets 
to Eugene Oliver in May of 1961 offering to sell the property 
to him for $300.00. No reply was received. In August of 
1962 Mr. Tippets again wrote to Mr. Oliver (Ex. 7) and offered 
to convey the land. No reply was received. 
In August of 1963 Eugene Oliver released any interest 
of his in the land. (Ex, 9). 
Neff Tippets had a conversation in the presence of Mrs. 
Oliver about the land in 1958 (Tr. 34) and he asked Mrs. Oliver, 
now Eva Jean Cornwell, If she wanted to purchase the land 
in 196 3. Mrs. Oliver said, "Youf11 have to see Eugene about 
that. He has got to pay for it." 
When the Tippets sold their land to the plaintiffs in 
1961 they excluded from the sale that portion of land here 
In dispute. (Tr* 46, 47). The disputed land was included 
in the contract with the plaintiffs only after Mrs. Oliver 
told Neff Tippets that he would have to talk with Eugene since 
he was the one who was to pay for the land, and after Eugene 
Oliver had released his interest in the land. 
Evidence to support the foregoing consisted at the. trial 
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of the testimony of Neff Tippets, one of the owners of the 
land in dispute. He testified with respect to conversations 
with Elder and Mr. and Mrs. Oliver. The court received copies 
of correspondence (Exs. 6 and 7) to support his oral testimony. 
Some of the strongest evidence is the release (Ex. 9) signed 
by Eugene Oliver releasing the land from any claim of his. 
POINT II 
THE PARTIES DID NOT MUTUALLY ACQUIESCE IN THE 
FENCE AS A BOUNDARY 
The right of the Olivers to the possession of the land 
in dispute was questioned by Neff Tippets in the 1950s. (Tr. 
29). Mr. Tippets testified he wrote to Elder in 1954 or 1955. 
(Tr. 30). 
Defendants' predecessor in title inquired of Neff Tippets 
about the title in 1958. Mr. Tippets talked with Eugene Oliver 
in the presence of the defendant Eva Jean Oliver Cornwell 
in 19 58 and pursuant to that discussion had a survey made 
and a description of the land made. (Tr. 34). 
A letter was written by Tippets to Oliver in May of 1961. 
(Tr. 35). Oliver released his interest in 1963 and this action 
was commenced in 1972. 
The record certainly would not support a finding that 
there vzas agreement or acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. 
POINT III 
THIS IS NOT A BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE CASE 
Every person, except Vivian M. Bezzant, who would have 
to have been a party to an agreement establishing the claimed 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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boundary, conveyed his interest In the property, the record 
title of which is owned by defendants, without including the 
land in dispute. 
Elders conveyed to Olivers. Olivers, including Eva Jean 
Cornwell, conveyed to Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation. 
Neither deed nor the deed back from Beneficial included the 
land in dispute. 
The cases which consider the doctrine of boundary line 
by acquiescence are well known to this court and are cited 
by the appellants In their brief. 
The recent case of Carter v. Lindner, 2 3 U. 2d 20 4, 460 
P. 2d 830 cites the earlier case of Christensen v. Christensen, 
9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P. 2d 101 and Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 
276 P. 912 for the proposition that unless there is an uncertain! 
with respect to the location of a boundary, that there can 
be no application of the boundary line by acquiescence doctrine. 
The very recent case of Wright v. Clissold, 521 P. 2d 
1224 states the elements necessary to establish a boundary 
line by acquiescence. The necessary elements are (1) occupation 
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings; 
(2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for 
a long period of years; (4) by adjoining land owners. 
The fence has existed for a considerable period of time. 
On the basis of the record the property in dispute has been 
occupied by the defendants and their predecessors in interest 
since some time in 1950. 
There has been no mutual acquiescence. As outlined above, 
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the record title holders of the property in dispute have always 
asserted ownership to that land and have never agreed that 
the fence line marked the true boundary line of the property. 
Had the defendants and their predecessors in title paid 
taxes on the property in dispute, then quite likely they could 
have obtained title through the doctrine of adverse possession. 
They did not pay the taxes and therefore that theory was not 
available to them. The payment of taxes is an essential ingredi-
ent of acquiring title through adverse possession. This is 
required by Title 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The 
requirement is mandatory. Central Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tarpey, 
51 U. 107, 168 P. 554. 
This case falls squarely within the rule enunciated in 
Hall v. Bingham, 528 P. 2d 151 in which this court said: 
"This is not a boundary by acquiescence case." In this case, 
as in Hall v. Bingham, supra, the land claimed by the defendants 
was not included in defendant Eva Jean Cornwellfs own deed 
when she conveyed the property to Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corporation. Neither was it included in the deed back to 
her from the Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation. The 
amount of land was not small. It had dimensions of 88.08 
feet by 5 7.05 feet and its omission could not have been an 
oversight. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY WILL NOT BE DESTROYED BY 
THE AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT 
Defendants presently occupy property having an east to 
-7-
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west dimensions of 167.06 feet. They hold record title to 
110 feet. Obviously the deprivation of the use of 57.06 feet 
will adversely affect the defendants1 property, but it will 
not remove their access to it. It merely renders their property 
less desirable. The difference in value to the property was 
not thought to be worth $300.00 to the defendant Eva Jean 
Cornwell. She could have obtained the land for that sum and 
refused to do so. (Tr. 48). 
CONCLUSION 
Record title to the disputed property is unquestionably 
in the respondents. Neither the respondents nor their predeces-
sors in title have ever agreed that the fence line found to 
exist in this case represented the true boundary line of the 
property. The record is full of evidence that there was no 
acquiesence in the claimed boundary line and that the record 
title holders have always claimed to be the true owners of 
the property. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. / 
IVIE and YOUNG 
4 8 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 846 01 
Telephone: 375-3000 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
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